„Svoboda tvé pěsti končí na špičce mého nosu“
— John Locke, kniha Two Treatises of Government
Two Treatises of Government (Dvě pojednání o vládě)
John Locke citáty
15 83
John Locke
Datum narození: 29. srpen 1632
Datum úmrtí: 28. říjen 1704
John Locke [džon lok] byl anglický filosof. Proslul zejména svou empiristickou teorií poznání a svou politickou filosofií, v níž hájil přirozenou svobodu a rovnost lidí. Hluboce ovlivnil britské osvícenství a pozdější liberální myšlení.
Díla
Citáty John Locke
„Nejsou žádné vrozené ideje.“
Zdroj: Slovník myslitelů. Velké postavy západního myšlení, str. 272, ISBN 80-7260-002-8
„The Indians, whom we call barbarous, observe much more decency and civility in their discourses and conversation“
— John Locke, kniha Some Thoughts Concerning Education
Sec. 145
Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693)
Kontext: The Indians, whom we call barbarous, observe much more decency and civility in their discourses and conversation, giving one another a fair silent hearing till they have quite done; and then answering them calmly, and without noise or passion. And if it be not so in this civiliz'd part of the world, we must impute it to a neglect in education, which has not yet reform'd this antient piece of barbarity amongst us.
„Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is thinking that makes what we read ours.“
As quoted in "Hand Book : Caution and Counsels" in The Common School Journal Vol. 5, No. 24 (15 December 1843) by Horace Mann, p. 371
Kontext: This is that which I think great readers are apt to be mistaken in; those who have read of everything, are thought to understand everything too; but it is not always so. Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is thinking that makes what we read ours. We are of the ruminating kind, and it is not enough to cram ourselves with a great load of collections; unless we chew them over again, they will not give us strength and nourishment.
„The greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for demonstration, nor can carry a train of proofs, which in that way they must always depend upon for conviction, and cannot be required to assent to till they see the demonstration.“
§ 243
The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695)
Kontext: The greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for demonstration, nor can carry a train of proofs, which in that way they must always depend upon for conviction, and cannot be required to assent to till they see the demonstration. Wherever they stick, the teachers are always put upon proof, and must clear the doubt by a thread of coherent deductions from the first principle, how long or how intricate soever that be. And you may as soon hope to leave all the day labourers and tradesmen, the spinsters and dairy-maids, perfect mathematicians, as to have them perfect in ethics this way: having plain commands is the sure and only course to bring them to obedience and practice: the greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must believe. And I ask, whether one coming from heaven in the power of God, in full and clear evidence and demonstration of miracles, giving plain and direct rules of morality and obedience, be not likelier to enlighten the bulk of mankind, and set them right in their duties, and bring them to do them, than by reasoning with them from general notions and principles of human reason?
„The necessity of believing without knowledge, nay often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others.“
— John Locke, kniha An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Book IV, Ch. 16, sec. 4
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689)
Kontext: For where is the man that has incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falsehood of all he condemns; or can say that he has examined to the bottom all his own, or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing without knowledge, nay often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least, those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men's belief, which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence to require others to follow them: but these are so few in number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reason to think, that, if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.
